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“[I]f a stone falls suddenly in the brush near an adult, he will usually mutter ‘a spirit’”                     
Margaret Mead’s (1932) notes on the                                                                                                           
Manus people of Papua New Guinea  
 
How do we determine whether some candidate causal factor is an actual cause of some particular 
outcome?1  Many philosophers have wanted a view of actual causation which fits with folk 
intuitions of actual causation (e.g., Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015; Hitchcock, 2007; Hitchcock 
and Knobe, 2009; Lewis, 1986; McDermott, 1995; McGrath, 2005; Mellor, 1995; Menzies, 
1996, 2009; Schaffer, 2000, 2004, 2005).  And those who wish to depart from folk intuitions of 
actual causation are often charged with the task of providing a plausible account of just how and 
where the folk have gone wrong.   
Thus, one important task for the revisionist is to meet the challenge from folk belief (Korman, 
2009): the revisionist should explain why the folk believe as they do when the resultant theory 
apparently conflicts with relevant folk beliefs.  In doing so, the revisionist should offer up an 
explanation that is not (1) globally self-defeating (i.e., challenging the very ability to form true 
beliefs) or (2) locally self-defeating (e.g., if one locates the alleged source of error in mistaken 
intuitions in ways that suggests a general skepticism about intuitive judgments, then one cannot 
also rely on intuitions to support the premises in an argument for some revisionary view).  As 
Korman puts it, “virtually everyone agrees that, even after having presented the arguments for 
their positions, proponents of revisionary philosophical theories—that is, those that deviate from 
the pretheoretical conception—are required to provide some sort of account of the conflict 
between their theories and the pretheoretical beliefs of non-philosophers (“the folk”)” (2009, p. 
242).  
Though many are pessimistic that the challenge from folk belief can be met—thinking for 
instance that “revisionists standardly delude themselves into thinking that they can plausibly 
explain why people make the mistakes they allege” (Hirsch, 2002, p. 117; see also e.g., Korman, 
2009, p. 242; Paul, 2012, p. 22)—I’m optimistic. My view is that, aided and guided by work 
from cognitive science, one can meet the challenge from folk belief by providing a targeted 
debunking explanation for the relevant folk intuitions in the target domain; that is, one that does 
                                                          
1 There is a standard distinction made between actual (or token or singular) causation, on the one hand, and generic 
(or type) causation, on the other.  Roughly, generic causation is typically thought to be a relation between types of 
events.  Actual causation is typically taken to be a relation between individual events (Lewis, 1986).  For example, 
we might say that “running causes weight loss”.  Or, we might say that “John’s running fifteen miles caused him to 
lose weight”.  The former would be a case of generic causation while the latter would be an example of actual 
causation.  My focus throughout is on actual causation. 
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not run afoul of the challenge from folk belief by succumbing to either global or local self-
defeat.   
My plan is to speak on behalf of the revisionist—in an empirically informed way—by providing 
a targeted debunking explanation for folk intuitions of actual causation.  Specifically, I’ll provide 
a two-pronged debunking explanation for folk intuitions of actual causation.  Both prongs target 
epistemically defective processes involved in generating folk intuitions of actual causation.  One 
process is rooted in a motivation to blame; the other is rooted in primitive teleological 
considerations.  Taken together, these two epistemically defective processes provide resources 
for helping meet the challenge from folk belief in the specific domain of actual causation and as 
such provide the revisionist with the resources for holding that measuring a theory of actual 
causation by its fit with folk intuitions of actual causation is not a wise policy. Folk intuitions of 
actual causation deserve to be rejected. 
To clarify, I won’t be casting a general pox on folk intuitions of actual causation by arguing that 
all aspects of causal cognition are infused with the motivation to blame or primitive teleological 
considerations.  My debunking explanation for folk intuitions of actual causation is targeted—
and thus tempered—and should be understood as follows: insofar as folk intuitions of actual 
causation are generated by a motivation to blame or primitive teleological considerations, then 
those intuitions deserve to be rejected.  This is a targeted debunking explanation for folk 
intuitions of actual causation.  It is thereby fit to meet the challenge from folk belief. 
The Plan:  I’ll begin by briefly documenting the role of folk intuitions of actual causation in 
evaluating theories of actual causation.  Then, in Section II, I’ll briefly discuss some background 
empirical work on folk intuitions of actual causation to set the stage for the two-pronged 
debunking explanation. In Section III, I present empirical evidence supporting the two-pronged 
debunking explanation.  Section IV discusses debunking and situates the empirical evidence 
within a background discussion of debunking and the challenge from folk belief.  Section V 
considers some objections. 
I. Fitting Folk Judgments of Actual Causation 
Perhaps one of the clearest statements that a theory of actual causation needs to respect folk 
intuitions comes from Lewis (1986): 
When common sense delivers a firm and uncontroversial answer about a not-too-far-
fetched case, theory had better agree.  If an analysis of causation does not deliver the 
common-sense answer, that is bad trouble (p. 94).   
Others have followed suit in thinking that folk intuitions about actual causation need to be 
respected (e.g., Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015; Hitchcock, 2007; Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009; 
Mellor, 1995; McDermott, 1995; McGrath, 2005; Menzies, 1996, 2009; Schaffer, 2000, 2004, 
2005). Yet some have departed from this, thinking that folk intuitions deserve to be rejected. 
For instance, Beebee (2004), in arguing that preventers and omissions are not causes, claims that 
the folk confuse causal explanation and causation and so argues for a dismissive take on alleged 
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folk intuitions that preventers and omissions are causes.2  And Dowe (2000, 2004), who is 
explicit about not placing “a premium on respecting folk intuitions”, realizes that “others do” and 
so takes up the task of explaining why we mistakenly treat preventers and omissions as causes: 
it’s because we confuse causation and quasi-causation.3   
So, fit with folk intuitions of actual causation is taken to serve as an important desideratum in 
evaluating theories of actual causation.   This is true not only for those who are engaged in 
conceptual analysis.  It’s also a constraint on theories which aim to produce causal concept(s) 
useful to scientists or metaphysicians (see e.g., Paul and Hall, 2013).  The constraint may be put 
as follows:  
[I]f an analysis of causation does not deliver the common-sense answer, that is certainly 
prima facie trouble, since it is evidence that something of importance has been 
overlooked. So it may make sense—but only up to a point!—to proceed as if your 
analysis has been refuted, when it runs afoul of common sense. (Paul and Hall, 2013, p. 
3) 
Even on this approach, “causal intuitions…[are] defeasible guides to potentially interesting and 
important features of our causal concept or a causal relation” and the philosopher needs to be 
“prepared to jettison those intuitions in the event that they are discovered to lead nowhere…”    
(p. 2). 
Whether a theory of actual causation should be applauded for fitting folk intuitions depends on 
whether those intuitions should be respected.  And empirical evidence on why the folk intuit as 
they do can help in deciding whether the relevant folk intuitions deserve respecting or rejecting.  
That said, I’ll briefly discuss some empirical work on folk intuitions of actual causation to set the 
stage both for my own studies and for the two-pronged debunking explanation. 
II. Empirical Work on Folk Judgments of Actual Causation 
There are two threads of empirical evidence I want to consider.  The first—which is more 
developed—concerns the role of moral considerations in folk intuitions of actual causation.  The 
second—understudied but taken up in the empirical studies below—concerns the role of 
primitive teleological considerations in folk intuitions of actual causation. 
2.1 Moral Considerations 
The role of moral considerations in generating judgments of actual causation is well documented 
(e.g., Alicke, 1992; Alicke, 2000; Alicke and Rose, 2010; Alicke, Rose and Bloom, 2011; 
Sytsma, Livengood and Rose, 2012).  For instance, Alicke (1992) presents evidence that, with all 
other factors held fixed across cases, people are much more willing to assign blame and 
causation to an individual involved in a car accident when that individual was speeding home to 
hide cocaine as opposed to an anniversary present.  And Alicke, Rose and Bloom (2011) model 
                                                          
2 Though see Livengood and Machery (2007) for evidence that the folk do distinguish causation and causal 
explanation. 
3 I’ve only offered a brief sampling of disputes over the common sense view of actual causation.  For more, see the 
excellent discussion in Paul and Hall (2013). 
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the causal relationship between judgments of blame and causation, finding that blame plays a 
direct causal role in generating judgments of actual causation.   
According to Alicke and colleagues, in the realm of harmful and offensive actions, folk intuitions 
of actual causation are skewed by a desire to blame those who we evaluate negatively.4  We 
exaggerate an actor’s causal role in bringing about an outcome since doing so allows us to 
support our desire to blame the agent.  Thus, our desire to blame an individual actually leads us 
to adjust our assessment of the agents causal role in the production of the outcome since doing so 
supports our desire to blame.   On this view, the effect of moral considerations on folk intuitions 
of actual causation is an error,5 rooted in a motivational bias to blame those who engage in 
harmful or offensive actions (see e.g., Alicke, 1992; Alicke, 2000; Alicke and Rose, 2010; 
Alicke, Rose and Bloom, 2011). 
This work suggests that there is a psychological process—which I’ll call the evaluative 
process—that plays a direct role in generating folk intuitions of actual causation.  This forms the 
basis for the first prong of my targeted debunking argument.  Though the evidence in favor of 
this process is well developed, I move beyond extant work in two key ways.  First, though much 
of the extant work on the role of moral considerations in causal judgments has focused on human 
action, I will provide evidence that the evaluative process extends beyond the realm of human 
action and do so by empirically integrating these results with results concerning promiscuous 
teleology (Section III).  And second, while some have claimed that the role of blame in causal 
judgment is a bias (e.g., Alicke and Rose, 2010; Alicke, Rose and Bloom, 2011) there has been 
no explicit discussion of the philosophical upshot of these empirical results.   I will, however, 
philosophically integrate these results within a debunking framework (Section IV) and thus 
provide the resources to clearly depart from those who hold that a philosophical theory of 
causation should respect morally laden causal intuitions (e.g., Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015; 
Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009; McGrath, 2005).  In doing so, I’m taking a stand on how best to 
interpret the role of moral considerations in causal judgment. 
Controversy remains as to how to best interpret the role of moral considerations in causal 
judgments.6  Where I see a glaring epistemically defective process, others see an epistemically 
appropriate process. For instance, on one leading view, Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) argue that 
norm violations directly impact judgments of actual causation.  People assign heightened 
causation when a causal candidate deviates from its normal state: judgments of actual causation 
are guided by norm violations broadly construed.  Blame plays no role at all in this. Given that 
the role of norm violations in causal judgment isn’t driven by blame, perhaps the role of norm 
violations in causal judgment is entirely appropriate.  However, a range of empirical evidence 
does not cohere well with the norm violation view.  For instance, Sytsma, Livengood and Rose 
(2011) provide evidence that typical behaviors, as opposed to atypical ones, lead to heightened 
causal assignment, which is the exact opposite of what Hitchcock and Knobe predict.  Moreover, 
                                                          
4 For ease, I’m only discussing the role of blame in causal judgment.  But, as Alicke, Rose and Bloom (2011) argue, 
causal assessments can also be influenced by a desire to praise.  Also, for evidence on the flip side of this—excuse 
validation—see Turri and Blouw (forthcoming).  
5 See Section 5.1 for further discussion. 
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this. 
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Alicke, Rose and Bloom (2011)—utilizing the cases presented by Hitchcock and Knobe as well 
as some of their own—present a range of empirical evidence supporting the view that the desire 
to blame plays a direct role in generating judgments of actual causation.   In light of this, I take 
the evidence to provide support for my interpretive stance: the role of moral considerations in 
causal judgment—captured in what I’ve called the evaluative process—is epistemically 
defective. 
That said, I would flag that the interpretive issue is far from settled. If the best interpretation of 
the role of moral considerations turns out to be that they are entirely appropriate, then this will 
undercut one prong of the debunking explanation I’ll be offering.  Even so, the second prong—to 
be discussed below—would still stand.  I won’t be trying to settle this interpretive issue here.  
Instead, I’m making a “judgment call” (Stich, 2013, p. 156).  But I take it that the evidence 
presented in Section III will further support the interpretive stance I’m taking.  I’ll also have a bit 
more to say in favor of my interpretation in Section 5.1.  
2.2. Agentive Considerations 
The second process involved in generating folk intuitions of actual causation—which I will call 
the agentive process—has been almost entirely neglected.  Some work suggests that agentive 
considerations—in particular, whether an individual’s behavior is construed as intentional or 
accidental—impact folk intuitions of actual causation.  For instance, work by Lagnado and 
Channon (2008), Channon, Lagnado, Drury, Matheson and Fitzpatrick (2010) and Lombrozo 
(2010) has found that when negative outcomes are brought about, individuals who bring about 
the outcome intentionally are assigned a greater causal role in producing the outcome than 
individuals who bring about the outcome by accident.  These studies have solely focused on the 
role intentionally and accidentally construed behaviors play in causal judgments about agents. 
But the specific process I’m targeting isn’t restricted to the domain of human action.  Rather, it 
extends to nature as a whole.  Evidence in support of this can be provided by considering work 
on promiscuous teleology. 
There is a wide range of evidence suggesting that people are promiscuous teleologists in that 
teleological considerations play a role not only in our conception of human actions, but also of 
artifacts, biological organisms and non-living natural things like rocks.  A range of evidence 
supports the view that children are promiscuous teleologists (e.g., Kelemen and Diyanni, 2005; 
Kelemen, 1999a, 1999b, 2004) in that they naturally accept such statements as “rocks are pointy 
to prevent animals from sitting on them”. Other work suggests that even adults never fully 
outgrow their childhood tendencies toward promiscuous teleology (e.g., Kelemen and Rosset, 
2009; Kelemen, Rottman and Seston, 2013; Lombrozo, Kelemen and Zaitchick, 2007).  For 
instance, Kelemen and Rosset (2009) found that college aged students indulge in accepting 
unwarranted teleological explanations—endorsing such statements as “The sun radiates heat 
because warmth nurtures life”, “Fungi grows in forests to help with decomposition” and even 
“Lightening occurs to release electricity” —even in scientific contexts.  Similarly, Kelemen et al 
(2013) also found that even trained physical scientists show a similar pattern of accepting 
unwarranted teleological explanations when their cognitive resources were limited (when in a 
“speeded task”).    
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Though there is a range of evidence that we’re inclined toward promiscuous teleological 
thinking, the question arises as to why we’re so inclined.  As Bloom (2007, p. 150) proposes: 
We have a bias to attribute an agent when we see nonrandom structure. When we see 
complex structure, we see it as the product of beliefs and goals and desires. We chew 
over the natural world with our social mode of understanding, and it is difficult to make 
sense of it in any other way. 
Support for the view that nature as a whole is viewed in agentive terms comes from work by 
Kelemen, Rottman and Seston (2013) who found that people’s endorsement of background Gaia 
beliefs predicted their tendency toward accepting teleological explanations. Other work—
specifically from the science education literature—suggests that people’s tendency toward 
viewing nature as a whole in agentive terms is one of the primary obstacles in students’ path to 
acquiring an adequate understanding of natural selection (see Galli and Meinardi, 2011 and 
Kelemen, 2012 for an overview).    For instance, students tend to think that a “personified 
“Mother Nature” responded to animal’s functional needs by generating or conferring the 
functional part with a view to preserving the animal’s survival” (Kelemen, 2012, p. 4; see also 
Kampourakis & Zogza, 2008; Moore et al., 2002; and Gregory, 2009), such as by stretching a 
giraffe’s neck so it could reach leaves on trees (e.g., Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985; 
Demastes, Settlage, & Good, 1995; Evans et al., 2010; Jensen & Finley,1995; Kampourakis and 
Zogza, 2008).  Summing all this up, Kelemen (2012, p. 7) writes: 
Findings suggesting that underlying beliefs about natural agency exert non-obvious 
influence on students’ biological reasoning are potentially less surprising when 
considered in a broader context of research which suggests that such immanent agentive 
ideas influence adults’ scientifically incorrect ideas about living and non-living nature 
more generally. For example, in contrast to their ratings of belief in God, students’ 
ratings of the Gaia notion that “Nature is driven to preserve living things” has been found 
to strongly predict undergraduates promiscuous (but often covert) tendencies to 
teleologically explain not only living but also non-living natural phenomena in terms of a 
purpose: That is, an agentive construal of nature provides a significant reason why 
American undergraduates find scientifically inaccurate teleological statements such as 
“the sun makes light so that plants can photosynthesize” highly believable even after 
extensive high school and college level instruction in both the physical and life sciences 
(Kelemen et al., 2013; also Kelemen & Rosset, 2009) 
Taken together, the evidence suggests that we’re inclined toward endorsing teleological 
explanations because we view nature as a whole in agentive terms.  More specifically, this work 
suggest that folk teleology is best understood as promiscuous teleomentalism, which is rooted in 
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a primitive, superstitious view of nature as a whole in agentive terms.7 Promiscuous 
teleomentalism represents a strong, robust tendency to error.8 
Though no work has looked at whether this agentive construal of nature—promiscuous 
teleomentalism—impacts folk intuitions of actual causation, there’s reason to expect that it will.  
People’s tendency toward teleological explanation is predicted by background agentive 
considerations.  Insofar as causation backs explanation, we should expect agentive 
considerations to impact folk intuitions of actual causation.  Thus, promiscuous 
teleomentalism—embodied in what I have called the agentive process—should have a direct 
impact on folk intuitions of actual causation. This forms the basis for the second prong of my 
targeted debunking argument.  Now, on to some direct evidence. 
III. Evidence for Two Processes 
Two candidate processes—the evaluative process and the agentive process—are hypothesized to 
play a role in generating folk intuitions of actual causation.  The first process involved in 
generating intuitions of actual causation—the evaluative process—enjoys more empirical 
support than the second process, the agentive process.  For this reason, most of the focus will be 
on providing support for the role of the agentive process in generating folk intuitions of actual 
causation.  But, I will provide some extensions to the extant work on the role of the evaluative 
process.  In particular, most of the work supporting this has been confined to causal judgments 
involving human actions.  The primary extension will be to investigate whether the evaluative 
process extends beyond the realm of human action. 
3.1. Study 1 
Study 1 was aimed at investigating whether manipulating an intentional construal of events 
affects causal judgments about human action and causal judgments for non-living natural objects 
like rocks.  Recall from Section 2.2, that some work has shown that manipulating whether an 
individual’s behavior is intentional or accidental affects causal judgments.  I’ll move beyond this 
work by doing two things (1) investigate whether an intentional or accidental construal of events 
affects causal judgments beyond the realm of human action and (2) model the causal 
relationships between the candidate variables under consideration. 
The cases for Study 1 had the following structure: A bird, Cantup, receives an essential nutrient, 
Keterine, from eating Weeble worms.  Weeble worms receive Keterine by feeding from a rock, 
Zenite, which produces the Keterine.  Zenite produces Keterine by absorbing heat.  As heat is 
absorbed, this initiates a chemical reaction in Zenite which produces Keterine.  The chemicals 
involved in producing Keterine are densely packed in the upper surface of Zenite.  Zenite is 
                                                          
7 Here I’m connecting  promiscuous teleology (i.e., that teleological explanations extend beyond the artifact and 
biological domain and play a role in explaining non-living natural phenomena) with teleomentalism (the view that 
the teleology of psychological intentions, goals, and purposes is the primary model for understanding teleology 
outside the domain of human action e.g., in considering non-living natural phenomena).  See Allen and Bekoff, 
1994, p. 13 for a discussion of teleomentalism in biology. 
8 Teleomentalism is typically regarded as an error and so eliminable.  See Allen (2009) and Allen and Bekoff (1994) 
for a discussion of the eliminability of teleomentalism in biology.   
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prevented from absorbing heat. As a result, Keterine is not produced and the Cantups slowly start 
to die. 
In the version involving a person, John moves Zenite so that it can absorb heat; in the version 
involving just the rock, Zenite redirects the chemicals toward the heat.  This is what I’ll call the 
Individual (John, Zenite) manipulation.  I also varied whether Zenite began producing Keterine 
and so the Cantups survived or whether Zenite failed to produce Keterine and so the Cantups 
died.  The purpose of this manipulation—which I’ll refer to as the Condition manipulation—was 
to vary an intentional or accidental construal of the events under consideration.  The guiding idea 
was that in trying to remedy a bad situation, sometimes we’re successful and other times we’re 
not.  When the goal is to fix a bad situation and we’re successful, the outcome should be more 
likely to be viewed as intentionally brought about in comparison to a case where we’re 
unsuccessful.   Together, the study was a 2(Individual: John, Zenite) x 2(Condition: Intentional, 
Accidental) design (for full cases see Appendix).  
3.1.1. Participants and Measures 
A total of 154 participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and randomly 
assigned to one of the four above conditions.  After reading the story, participants were given the 
following probes (in random order): 
Causation Probe: [John/Zenite] caused the Cantups to [survive/die].9 
Intentionality Probe: [John/Zenite] intentionally [helped/harmed] the Cantups.10 
Evaluation Probe: How would you evaluate [John’s/Zenite’s] behavior?11 
 
3.1.2. Results 
Here are the t-tests for both John and the rock: 
 
John Cases Good 
Outcome 
(Intentional) 
Bad 
Outcome 
(Accidental) 
t-value p-value 
Causation 5.47(.646) 3.15(1.85) 7.27 .000 
Evaluation 5.31(.701) 3.92(1.04) 6.81 .000 
Intentionality 5.71(.459) 1.65(1.45) 16.35 .000 
Rock Cases 
 
    
Causation 4.95(1.31) 3.60(1.59) 4.02 .000 
Evaluation 4.03(1.06) 3.24(.942) 3.44 .001 
                                                          
9 Responses were made on a 6-pt scale anchored with 1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree 
10 Responses were made on a 6-pt scale anchored with 1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree 
11 Responses were made on a 6-pt scale anchored with 1=extremely blameworthy, 6=extremely praiseworthy 
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Intentionality 2.54(1.61) 1.48(1.05) 3.45 .001 
 
Table 1: Study 1 t-tests 
An ANOVA revealed a statistically significant large-sized effect of Condition (Intentional, 
Accidental) on causal judgments F(1, 150)=62.797, p<.001, ηp2=.295, no statistically significant 
effect of Individual (John, Rock) on causal judgments, F(1, 150)=.027, p=.869, and a statistically 
significant small-sized interaction between Condition and Individual F(1, 150)=4.518, p=.035, 
ηp2=.029.   
 
Figure 1: Causal Judgments for John and the Rock 
Importantly, the results indicate that regardless of whether the individual was an agent or a rock, 
the outcome had a dramatic effect on causal judgments.  The crucial question now is: why is this 
pattern in people’s causal judgments arising? Given that there was an interaction between 
Condition and Individual, I’ll analyze responses in the rock and John cases separately to 
determine why this pattern is arising. 
 
3.1.2.1. John Cases 
1
2
3
4
5
6
Survive Die
Cause
John Rock
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I’ll begin by looking at responses in the John cases. To determine the causal relationships among 
the candidate variables, I ran a causal search on the data, using Greedy Equivalence Search 
(GES).12  GES returned the following model:13 
 
Two things are worth noting about this model.  The first is that evaluations of John’s behavior 
make no contribution to causal judgments.  Second, and more importantly, intentionality 
judgments screen off the effect of condition on causal judgments: whether John is viewed as a 
cause of the outcome depends on the extent to which he is viewed as intentionally bringing about 
the outcome.  When the outcome is negative, participants are much less likely to view John as 
intentionally bringing about the outcome in comparison to the case where the outcome is 
positive.   
3.1.2.2. Rock: Cases 
Next, to understand the causal relationships between the candidate variables in the rock cases, I 
ran a causal search on the data.  GES returned the following model:14 
                                                          
12 Roughly, GES operates by considering the possible models available given the different variables. GES begins by 
assigning an information score to the null model (i.e., a disconnected graph). GES then considers various possible 
arrows (“edges”) between the different variables. It begins by adding the edge that yields the greatest improvement 
in the information score (if there is such an edge) and repeats the process until additional edges would not further 
improve the information score.  GES then considers deletions which would yield the greatest improvement in the 
information score (if there is such an edge), repeating this procedure until no further deletions will improve the 
score. In all cases, the orientation of the edges is given by edge-orientation rules in Meek (1997). It has been shown 
by Chickering (2002) that, given enough data, GES will return the true causal model of the data. GES is often 
interpreted as returning the best fitting causal model, given the data. (For further details and some applications, see 
Chickering, 2002; Rose et al., 2011; Rose and Nichols, 2013) 
13 This model fits the data well, df=3, X2=4.9871, p=.1727, BIC=-8.0051 
14 This model fits the data well, df=3, X2=6.0381, p=.1098, BIC=-6.9933 
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In comparison to the cases involving John, in the rock cases, Intentionality had no effect on 
causal judgments.  Moreover, whereas Intentionality screens off the effect of Condition on causal 
judgments for the cases involving John, here we see that people’s evaluations screen off the 
effect of Condition on causal judgments.    
Perhaps it’s the case that the agentive process plays a role in generating causal judgments for 
human action but not non-living natural objects like rocks.  For non-living natural objects like 
rocks, it may be that the evaluative process as opposed to the agentive process plays a role.  If so, 
this would still provide support for the two-pronged debunking argument on offer.  But it may be 
that people’s explicit judgments of intentionality are not a good guide here.  Indeed, it does seem 
quite unnatural to explicitly say that a rock was intentionally harming or helping. So, perhaps 
explicitly asking about intentionality for cases involving non-living natural objects is not the best 
way to probe for whether the agentive process is playing a role in people’s causal judgments for 
these cases.  A different measure would be preferable.  I’ll take this up in Study 2. 
 
3.2. Study 2 
3.2.1. Participants and Measures 
Endorsement of quasi-religious Gaia beliefs has been shown to significantly predict people’s 
tendency to endorse teleological explanations (Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston 2013).  To 
determine whether the agentive process is having an effect on people’s causal judgments in cases 
involving non-living natural objects, I ran the same cases involving a rock that were used above, 
used the same probes as above, but—borrowing from Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston (2013)—
added in measures to probe for Gaia Beliefs.  They were:15 
(1) I believe Nature is driven to preserve living things 
(2) I believe the Earth is alive 
(3) I believe that Nature is a powerful being 
(4) I believe the Earth is driven to provide optimal conditions for Life 
                                                          
15 Ratings for each of these probes was made on a 6-pt scale anchored with 1=strongly disagree, 6=strongly agree. 
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211 participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and randomly assigned to either 
the good outcome or bad outcome cases. 
3.2.2. Results 
First, here are the t-tests: 
 Good 
Outcome 
(Intentional) 
Bad 
Outcome 
(Accidental) 
t-
value 
p-value 
Causation 4.67(1.29) 3.29(1.71) 7.02 .000 
Evaluation 4.14(1.07) 3.29(1.01) 5.90 .000 
Intentionality 2.41(1.52) 1.56(1.12) 4.56 .000 
Gaia 4.39(1.28) 4.08(1.34) 1.75 .081 
 
Table 2: Study 2 t-tests 
 
Second, the results from the Rock cases above were replicated.  Next, I examined the inter-
correlations between the various Gaia Belief Probes, finding that they exhibited a high degree of 
internal consistency.16  So, I combined them together to form Gaia Composite.   
I then ran a causal search on the data.  GES returned the following model:17 
 
 
Just as with John, where it was found that judgments of intentionality directly caused causal 
judgments, so too with Zenite the rock, Gaia Beliefs directly caused causal judgments.  This 
suggests that just as the agentive process directly affects causal judgments for human actions, 
non-obvious agentive considerations—as measured by Gaia beliefs—directly affect causal 
judgments for non-living natural things. 
                                                          
16 Cronbach’s Alpha=.847 
17 This model fits the data well, df=4, X2=5.3028, p=.2576, BIC=-16.1047 
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One of my main claims is that the agentive process plays a causal role in generating judgements 
of actual causation.  Utilizing Gaia beliefs as a measure for whether the agentive process plays a 
causal role in generating judgments of actual causation beyond the realm of human action, the 
results from the causal modeling provide key, strong support for this main claim: background 
Gaia beliefs do indeed play a direct role in generating causal judgments. Indeed, the results from 
the causal modeling show that as Gaia belief increases, so too does causal judgment. On its own 
the results from the causal modeling are sufficient to provide support for the causal hypothesis 
that the agentive process generates causal judgments and moreover is sufficient to support one 
prong of the debunking explanation I’ll set out below in Section IV. That said, there is a 
secondary question regarding the way in which the intentional/accidental construal of events 
works among those with different background Gaia beliefs.  Here are two main things we might 
expect on the present proposal: (1) the impact of the intentional/accidental construal of events 
will have a greater impact on causal judgments for those displaying High Gaia Belief and (2) 
when the event is construed intentionally causal judgments should be greater for those displaying 
High Gaia Belief.18  Taking those who had an overall score between 1 and 3 on Gaia Composite 
as displaying Low Gaia Belief and those who had an overall score between 4 and 6 on Gaia 
Composite as displaying High Gaia Belief this is exactly what we find: 
 Good 
Outcome 
(Intentional) 
Bad 
Outcome 
(Accidental) 
t-
value 
p-value Cohen’s 
d 
High Gaia 
Belief 
4.87(1.05) 3.47(1.77) 5.70 .000 .962 
Low Gaia 
Belief 
4.09(1.84) 2.56(1.59) 2.95 .005 .884 
t-value 2.46 2.17  
p-value .016 .032   
Cohen’s d .521 .541 
 
Table 3: High and Low Gaia Belief and Causal Judgments 
 
First, among those who displayed High Gaia Belief and among those that displayed Low Gaia 
Belief, the intentional and accidental construal of events produced differences in causal 
judgments (left to right in the above table), though the magnitude of the difference was larger for 
those displaying High Gaia Belief.  So (1) above is supported. Second, within the intentional 
condition, there were differences in causal judgments among those who displayed Low and High 
Gaia Belief (top to bottom in the above table), with those displaying High Gaia Belief being 
                                                          
18 One might think that for (2) we should instead expect that the intentional/accidental construal of events will never 
have an impact on causal judgments among those displaying Low Gaia Belief.  But as the results of Kelemen et al. 
(2013) show, even those who display Low Gaia Belief sometimes display promiscuous teleological tendencies, 
although to a lesser extent than those with High Gaia Belief (see Rose, 2015 for further discussion).  
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significantly more inclined to assign causation. So (2) above is supported.  This can be visualized 
in the following graph: 
 
Figure 2: High and Low Gaia Belief Causal Judgments in Good Outcome (Intentional) and 
Bad Outcome (Accidental) Cases 
Putting all of this together, the main, key issue at hand—whether the agentive process plays a 
causal role in generating causal judgments—gains support from the causal modeling results.  On 
its own, this finding provides strong support for the hypothesis that the agentive process plays a 
role in generating causal judgments.  The secondary issue—how the intentional/accidental 
construal of events affects those with Low and High Gaia Belief—also gains support in that (1) 
the impact of the intentional/accidental construal of events was greater for those displaying High 
Gaia Belief and (2) when the event was construed intentionally, those with High Gaia Belief 
were significantly more inclined to assign causation.  One key limitation of the present study 
though is that an intentional/accidental construal of events is not varied within cases where the 
outcome is good or bad.  Moreover, it would be useful to know if the agentive process plays a 
role in generating causal judgments in other kinds of cases.  The next study takes up both of 
these issues. 
3.3. Study 3 
To extend the pattern of findings that the agentive process generates causal judgments, I decided 
to run a new set of cases, this time involving a plant.  Moreover, since the extant research on the 
effect of agential considerations on causal judgment has only been conducted with cases where 
the outcome is negative (e.g., Lagnado and Channon, 2008; Channon, Lagnado, Drury, 
Matheson and Fitzpatrick, 2010; Lombrozo, 2010), I wanted to look at cases where an 
intentional/accidental construal is varied within cases with a positive and negative outcome.   
Here is an overview of the cases: Suzy discovers a rare plant, called Cerbolis.  Some of the plants 
live longer than others. The reason is that Cerbolis coats its leaves with a toxin to prevent insects 
1
2
3
4
5
6
High Gaia Belief Low Gaia Belief
Gaia Belief and Causal Judgment
Intentional Accidental
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from eating it.  Some Cerbolis plants produce excess amounts of the toxin and poison 
themselves.  She assigns her intern, Andy, to study the plants and find out why some produce 
excess amounts of toxin. 
Across the cases, I varied whether a person—Andy—or a biological structure—KKM—was the 
target candidate causal factor. In the cases involving the person, Andy is responsible for 
administering the toxin to the plant, while in the cases involving the biological structure, KKM is 
responsible for administering the toxin.   I also varied whether the outcome was good (an 
appropriate amount of the toxin was released and the plant survived) or bad (excess amounts of 
the toxin were released and the plant was killed) and whether administering too much or the right 
amount of the toxin was described as intentional or accidental. This resulted in a 2(Case: KKM, 
Andy) x 2(Behavior: Accidental, Intentional) x 2(Outcome: Good, Bad) design (for full cases see 
Appendix).    
3.3.1. Participants and Measures 
372 participants were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and randomly assigned to 
one of eight conditions.  After reading the cases, participants were given the following probes (in 
random order):19 
Causation Probe: [KKM/Andy] caused the Cerbolis plant to [die/survive]. 
Evaluation Probe: How would you evaluate [KKM’s/Andy’s] behavior? 
Intentionality Probe: [KKM/Andy] intentionally [killed/saved] Cerbolis. 
Finally, in only the cases involving KKM participants were given the same Gaia Belief probes as 
used in Study 2. 
3.3.2 Results 
Here are the t-tests for the KKM cases: 
Good Outcome Intentional Accidental t-value p-value 
Causation 4.61(1.16) 4.51(1.33) .428 .669 
Evaluation 4.09(1.18) 4.04(.988) .256 .799 
Intentionality 3.77(1.62) 2.60(1.49) 3.69 .000 
Gaia 4.80(1.06) 4.29(1.31) 2.15 .034 
 
Bad Outcome 
 
Intentional 
 
Accidental 
 
t-value 
 
p-value 
Causation 4.71(1.15) 3.80(1.64) 3.37 .001 
Evaluation 2.52(1.13) 3.48(1.01) -4.76 .000 
Intentionality 2.66(1.30) 1.70(1.15) 4.12 .000 
Gaia 4.33(1.22) 4.40(1.30) -.320 .749 
 
                                                          
19 The scales for the probes were the same as those used in Study 1. 
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Table 4: T-tests for KKM cases with Behavior as IV 
 
And here are the t-tests for the Andy cases: 
Good Outcome Intentional Accidental t-value p-value 
Causation 4.69(1.12) 4.47(1.46) .777 .440 
Evaluation 4.32(.918) 3.84(1.01) 2.26 .026 
Intentionality 4.62(1.51) 2.65(1.68) 5.55 .000 
 
Bad Outcome 
 
Intentional 
 
Accidental 
 
t-value 
 
p-value 
Causation 5.05(1.27) 3.78(1.94) 3.37 .001 
Evaluation 2.64(1.11) 3.74(.977) -4.58 .000 
Intentionality 4.15(1.42) 1.31(.702) 11.05 .000 
 
Table 5: T-tests for Andy cases with Behavior as IV 
 
An ANOVA revealed a main effect of Behavior, F(1, 364)=17.836, p<.001 ηp2=.047 but no main 
effect of Outcome, F(1, 364)=2.440, p=.119 or of Case F(1, 364)=.428, p=.514.  However, the 
main effect of Behavior was qualified by a two-way interaction between Behavior and Outcome, 
F(1, 364)=9.578, p=.002, ηp2=.026.  There were no other significant two way interactions nor 
was there a significant three way interaction. 
Analyzing just the data involving KKM, an ANOVA revealed a main effect of Behavior F(1, 
214)=7.362, ηp2=.034 and no main effect of Outcome F(1, 214)=2.557.  The main effect of 
Behavior was qualified by a two way interaction with the Outcome F(1, 214)=4.524, p=.035, 
ηp2=.021.  This can be seen in the following graph: 
 
Figure 3: Causal Judgments in Non-Agent (KKM) Cases 
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Given the interaction between Behavior and Outcome for the cases involving KKM, I’ll run two 
separate causal searches, one for the cases where the outcome is good and another one for the 
cases where the outcome is bad.20  Here is the model for the good outcome cases:21 
 
 
 
And, here is the model for the bad outcome cases:22 
 
 
Again, one of my main claims—that the agentive process plays a causal role in generating 
judgements of actual causation—gains strong support from the causal modeling results.  These 
results show that background Gaia beliefs do indeed play a direct role in generating causal 
judgments and that as Gaia belief increases, so too does causal judgment.  To reiterate, and 
further emphasize, the results from the causal modeling are, on their own, sufficient to provide 
                                                          
20 The inter-correlations between the various Gaia Belief probes was high, Cronbach Alpha=.863 for good outcome 
cases, Cronbach Alpha=.887 and so the items were combined into a single measure to yield Gaia Belief Composite.   
21 This model fits the data well, X2=3.7328, df=5, p=.5885, BIC—19.2428 
22 This model fits the data well X2=7.5765, df=4, p=.1084, BIC=-11.4032 
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support for the causal hypothesis that the agentive process generates causal judgments. Moreover 
this result is sufficient to support one prong of the debunking explanation (Section IV). But, as 
with Study 2, there is a secondary question about the way in which the intentional/accidental 
construal of events works among those with different background Gaia beliefs.  Again, as with 
Study 2, two main things are expected: (1) the impact of the intentional/accidental construal of 
events will have a greater impact on causal judgments for those displaying High Gaia Belief and 
(2) when the event is construed intentionally causal judgments should be greater for those 
displaying High Gaia Belief. To examine both (1) and (2) I followed the same procedure in 
Study 2 for grouping responses into High and Low Gaia Belief. The pattern of findings for those 
who display High and Low Gaia Belief in the Bad Outcome cases are presented in Table 6, while 
the pattern of findings for the Good Outcome cases are presented in Table 7. 
 
 
 Intentional Accidental t-
value 
p-value Cohen’s 
d 
High Gaia 
Belief 
4.95(.986) 4.02(1.67) 3.06 .003 .678 
Low Gaia 
Belief 
3.62(1.76) 3.13(1.80) .559 .585 .275 
t-value 3.03 1.36  
p-value .004 .179   
Cohen’s d .932 .512 
 
Table 6: Causal Judgments for High and Low Gaia Belief in Bad Outcome Cases 
 
 Intentional Accidental t-
value 
p-value Cohen’s 
d 
High Gaia 
Belief 
4.79(1.09) 4.53(1.29) .915 .363 .217 
Low Gaia 
Belief 
3.60(1.51) 4.18(1.60) -.684 .505 .372 
t-value 2.20 .727  
p-value .033 .472   
Cohen’s d .904 .240 
 
Table 7: Causal Judgments for High and Low Gaia Belief in Good Outcome Cases 
In the Bad Outcome cases, among those who displayed High Gaia Belief and among those that 
displayed Low Gaia Belief, the intentional and accidental construal of events produced 
differences in causal judgments (left to right in Table 6), with the intentional/accidental construal 
of events having a much greater impact on causal judgments among those with High Gaia Belief. 
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So, as with Study 2, (1) is supported.  In addition, those with High Gaia Belief were significantly 
more inclined to assign causation when the outcome was viewed as being brought about 
intentionally (top to bottom in Table 6).  Again, and as with Study 2, (2) is supported.  
In the Good Outcome cases (Table 7), among those who displayed High Gaia Belief and among 
those that displayed Low Gaia Belief, the intentional and accidental construal of events did not 
produce differences in causal judgments (left to right in Table 7). So (1) doesn’t gain support for 
the Good Outcome cases (more on this in Section 3.4). But there was a significant difference 
uncovered between those with High and Low Gaia Belief within the intentional condition, with 
those displaying High Gaia Belief being significantly more likely to assign causation (top to 
bottom in Table 7). So (2) is supported for these case.  These results can also be seen in the 
following graph: 
  
Figure 4: Gaia Belief and Causal Judgment for Bad Outcome Cases (Left) and Good 
Outcome Cases (Right) 
 
Analyzing the data involving Andy, an ANOVA revealed a main effect of Behavior F(1, 
154)=10.003, p=.002, ηp2=.061 and no main effect of Outcome F(1, 154)=.495, p=.483.  The 
main effect of Behavior was qualified by a two way interaction with the Outcome F(1, 
154)=4.880, p=.029, ηp2=.031.  This can be seen in the following graph: 
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Figure 5: Causal Judgments in Agent (Andy) Cases 
As with the cases involving KKM, since there was an interaction between Behavior and 
Outcome for the cases involving Andy, I conducted two separate causal searches, one for the 
cases where the outcome is good and the other for the cases where the outcome is bad.  Here is 
the causal model for the cases where the outcome is good:23 
 
 
And here is the causal model for the cases where the outcome is bad:24 
 
                                                          
23 This model fits the data well, X2=1.2709, df=3, p=.7361, BIC=-11.9125 
24 This model fits the data well, X2=.3155, df=2, p=.8541, BIC=-8.3722 
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3.4. Summary of Results 
One of the crucial, key claims—that the agentive process causes causal judgments—gains strong 
support from the causal modeling results in Study 3.  As with Study 2, explicit judgments of 
intentionality had no effect on causal judgments for the cases involving the biological 
mechanism, though the manipulation of whether the behavior was viewed as intentional or 
accidental, as revealed by differences on this measure, was successful (see Table 4).  But 
interestingly, regardless of whether the outcome was good or bad, Gaia beliefs directly caused 
causal judgments.  In line with Study 2, this suggests that non-obvious agentive considerations 
directly impact causal judgments beyond the realm of human action.  Moreover, the model 
produced for the negative outcome cases involving the agent was comparable to the model 
produced for the biological mechanism in the negative outcome cases.  This model showed that 
both intentionality and evaluative judgments have a joint effect on causal judgment, which was 
similar to the model involving the biological mechanism, where it was found that both Gaia 
Beliefs and evaluations produced a joint effect on causal judgment.  For the positive outcome 
cases, the models for the agent and the biological mechanism were somewhat different.  For the 
biological mechanism cases, Gaia Beliefs directly caused causal judgment while for the agent 
cases, intentionality judgments indirectly caused causal judgments via evaluative judgments.  
Taken together, the results from the causal modeling provide strong support for two of the main 
hypotheses: namely, that the agentive and evaluative processes play a causal role in generating 
causal judgments.   
The secondary issue—how the intentional/accidental construal of events works among those 
with different background Gaia Beliefs—also gained support. Just as in Study 2, it was found 
that, for both the Good and Bad Outcome cases, when the event was construed intentionally (i.e., 
in the Intentional Conditions) causal judgments were greater for those displaying High Gaia 
Belief.  It was also found that, just as in Study 2, the impact of the intentional/accidental 
construal of events had a greater impact on causal judgments for those displaying High Gaia 
Belief, though this result only obtained in the Bad Outcome cases.  The main question now is 
why the intentional/accidental construal of events did not have an impact on causal judgments 
among those with High and Low Gaia Belief in the Good Outcome cases.   
One reason that this asymmetric effect may be arising is because we have a deep seated, implicit 
“intentionality bias” where the default is to view behavior as intentional and only by effortfully 
overriding this bias do we come to view behavior as accidental (Rosset, 2008).  In negative 
outcome cases, the intentionality bias may be overridden when doing so would excuse the person 
or object and “let them off the hook”.  In positive outcome cases, since there’s no need to excuse, 
the implicit intentionality bias is not overridden. If this is right then though we shouldn’t always 
expect to find differences in causal judgments based on whether the events are construed 
intentionally or accidentally in positive outcome cases, we might nonetheless expect that those 
with High Gaia Belief will be more susceptible to the intentionality bias when considering good 
outcome cases.  This is just what we find.  Those with High Gaia Belief (M=4.68, SD=1.18) 
were more inclined to assign causation overall than those with Low Gaia Belief (M=4.0, 
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SD=1.54), t(88)=1.96, p=.05. This suggests that those with High Gaia Belief are indeed more 
susceptible to the intentionality bias when considering good outcome cases.   
In sum: the pattern of results suggest that the influence of agentive considerations on causal 
attributions is direct, robust and similar regardless of whether causal judgments are made with 
respect to human actions or non-agents.  And in line with previous research, the evaluative 
process also plays a role in generating folk judgments of actual causation.  Importantly, this work 
has been extended. While one may have thought that the evaluative process is only operative 
when making causal judgments about human action, the results suggest the evaluative process 
extends beyond the realm of human action.  The reason it extends beyond the realm of human 
action is because the folk take a perspective on reality whereby it is infused with agency.  That 
is, the evaluative process extends beyond the realm of human action because it is connected to 
promiscuous teleomentalism.  Thus I claim empirical support for the claim that two processes—
the evaluative and agentive processes—play a role in generating folk intuitions of actual 
causation.  On to debunking. 
 
IV. Debunking Folk Intuitions of Actual Causation 
Given empirical support for two processes—the evaluative and agentive processes—playing a 
role in generating folk intuitions of actual causation, I now want to situate the findings within a 
background discussion of debunking.  Having done that, I’ll then discuss the challenge from folk 
belief, showing how the targeted debunking explanation on offer is fit to meet the challenge.   
The specific version of debunking that I will be offering invokes the following two level 
structure: 
(1) S’s belief that P is based on an epistemically defective process. 
(2) Insofar as S* relies on S’s belief that P as reason to accept P, accepting (1) serves as 
an undermining defeater for S*’s belief that P. 
Level one invokes a claim about the causal origins of a belief, where the causal origin of the 
candidate belief issues from an epistemically defective process.  Level one only shows that S’s 
belief is unjustified.  It does not yet show that S*’s belief, at Level 2, is unjustified.  Prior to 
learning about S’s belief issuing from an epistemically defective process, S*’s belief is prima 
facie justified.  After learning that S’s belief issues from an epistemically defective process, this 
acts as an undermining defeater for S*’s belief.  This is the second level of debunking. 
An illustration.  Suppose John suffers from a throbbing headache.  He visits a doctor who 
displays various credentials in her office which attest to her medical expertise.  The expert doctor 
tells John that his throbbing headache calls for special treatment.  John must apply lipstick to his 
forehead to alleviate the headache.  Since forming beliefs on the basis of expert testimony is 
typically a good way of forming beliefs, John’s belief is prima facie justified.  If this were all 
there were to the story, and thus there were no undefeated defeaters, John’s belief might enjoy 
the status of ultima facie justification.  But there’s more.  John learns that the alleged medical 
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expert is actually an expert in astrological medicine.  The doctor’s belief that applying lipstick to 
the forehead alleviates headaches issues from an epistemically defective process.  Upon learning 
this, John’s belief suffers from an undermining defeater (Pollock, 1987).  This case invokes the 
above two level structure: (1) the testimony of S does not provide good evidence for S*’s belief 
that P (since S’s belief issues from an epistemically defective process—astrological reasoning) 
and (2) after S* becomes aware of (1), S*’s belief that P on the basis of (1) suffers from an 
undermining defeater.   
I won’t attempt to provide an account of what makes a process epistemically defective.25 For my 
purposes, all that is required is agreement on which processes are epistemically defective.  
Indeed, even among those who deeply disagree about what makes a process epistemically 
defective, there is agreement on which processes are epistemically defective.  For instance, 
Goldman (1979)—who offers an externalist account of what makes a process epistemically 
defective—includes the following processes on his list of epistemically defective processes: 
“confused reasoning, wishful thinking, reliance on emotional attachment, mere hunch or 
guesswork, and hasty generalization”. Cohen (1984, p. 282-283) agrees on which processes are 
epistemically defective, but offers an internalist account of what makes these processes 
epistemically defective.  That said, all that is required is agreement that the evaluative process 
and agentive process are epistemically defective processes when they generate judgments of 
actual causation. I take it that these two processes are clear cases of epistemically defective 
processes.  Now to the specific debunking argument for actual causation. 
Both the evaluative and agentive processes seem, at least prima facie, to be epistemically 
defective bases for making judgments of actual causation.26  Insofar as folk judgments of actual 
causation issue from either the evaluative or agentive processes, their judgments of actual 
causation are prima facie unjustified. Philosophers who rely on folk intuitions of actual causation 
as support for a theory of actual causation are faced with an undermining defeater.  Putting this 
together:   
(1). Folk intuitions of actual causation are based on epistemically defective processes (the 
evaluative and agentive processes). 
(2). Insofar as philosophers rely on folk intuitions of actual causation as a reason to 
accept a view of actual causation, accepting (1) would be an undermining defeater for the 
philosopher’s belief.  
To clarify, I don’t take this debunking argument to undermine the usefulness of philosophers’ 
intuitions in disputes about actual causation.  And I’m not claiming that the philosopher who 
endorses a view of actual causation on the basis of her own intuitions or on considerations 
independent of folk intuitions of actual causation suffers from an undermining defeater.  Rather, 
                                                          
25 I follow Kahane (2011) in associating undermining defeaters and debunking explanations (p. 106) which have a 
two-level structure.  But I depart from Kahane in that while Kahane is focused on evolutionary debunking 
arguments, my focus is only on psychological debunking arguments (Nichols, 2014).  
26 For more, see Section 5.1. 
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I take the psychological findings to provide the basis for an argument that debunks philosophical 
views which are based, at least in part, on fitting folk intuitions about actual causation. 
I would also clarify that the debunking argument on offer is a two-pronged debunking argument.  
It’s two-pronged since two epistemically defective processes have been put forward: the 
evaluative and agentive processes.  The claim about the epistemically defective processes should 
thus be read disjunctively.  Indeed, it is inclusive since as the empirical evidence suggests, in 
certain contexts, one or both processes may be generating folk intuitions of actual causation.  
Thus, the claim is not that both processes always play a role in generating folk intuitions of 
actual causation.  Sometimes it is one; sometimes it is both.   
I would emphasize that I take the two-pronged debunking argument to mark an advantage for the 
would-be debunker who might have wanted to go it alone on the basis of the evaluative process 
playing a role in generating folk intuitions of actual causation.  This debunker—with only the 
evaluative process in hand—might be charged with offering a weak debunking argument.  Those 
who would insist on following the folk might simply suggest that those who would debunk folk 
intuitions of actual causation on basis of the evaluative process alone have only shown that folk 
intuitions of actual causation are undercut in the realm of human action, where the evaluative 
process is most likely to be restricted.  And so those who would hold that a philosophical theory 
of actual causation should be beholden to folk intuitions of actual causation might recommend 
that only those folk intuitions generated in response to events outside the realm of human action 
are worthy of respecting since—so the suggestion might go— outside the realm of human action, 
blame does not influence folk intuitions of actual causation.27  But as the above results suggest, 
this is not the case.  The evaluative process extends beyond the realm of human action because it 
is connected with promiscuous teleomentalism.  Those who may have been attracted to 
debunking folk intuitions of actual causation on basis of the evaluative process alone should thus 
find the two-pronged debunking argument on offer appealing.  It provides a stronger debunking 
argument: the two-pronged debunking argument extends the evaluative process beyond the realm 
of human action by connecting it with promiscuous teleomentalism, which is embodied in the 
agentive process. 
Though the specific two-pronged debunking argument is stronger than a debunking argument 
based on the evaluative process alone, it is not undiscriminating and thus unfit for meeting the 
challenge from folk belief.  Rather the two-pronged debunking argument on offer is targeted and 
thus fit for meeting the challenge from folk belief. Recall that the challenge was for the 
revisionist to explain why the folk believe as they do when the resultant theory apparently 
conflicts with relevant folk beliefs and do so in a way that is not (1) globally self-defeating or (2) 
locally self-defeating.  As for global self-defeat, the two pronged debunking argument locates the 
mistake in two epistemically defective processes—the evaluate and agentive processes—and 
thus the two-pronged debunking argument is not premised on any claim about some general 
                                                          
27 Indeed something along these lines might explain why those who have investigated the role of evaluative 
considerations in generating intuitions of actual causation have not explicitly argued for a debunking explanation of 
folk intuitions of actual causation.  Likewise, something along these lines might also explain why some have upheld 
respecting folk intuitions despite the fact that they are generated by evaluative considerations within the realm of 
human action.   
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inability of the folk to form true beliefs about the world.  Neither does the two-pronged 
debunking argument succumb to local self-defeat.  My specific results on folk intuitions of actual 
causation do not call into question the general usefulness of philosophers’ intuitions in the target 
domain of actual causation.28  Indeed, I do not ever appeal to naive teleological reasoning or 
blame myself in debunking. In this way I hope to have illustrated a stable and targeted strategy 
for debunking folk intuitions. 
Finally, a few clarifications. First, I would note that the two-pronged debunking argument is not 
aimed at casting a general pox on folk intuitions of actual causation.  The claim is not that causal 
cognition, as a whole, is infected by either of the two epistemically defective processes.  Indeed, 
concerning the evaluative process, Danks, Rose and Machery (2013) provide evidence that 
whether moral considerations impact causal judgments depends on whether one learns about 
causal relations on the basis of experience or on the basis of description, as in the case of thought 
experiments.  Specifically, they present evidence that moral considerations play a significant role 
in impacting causal intuitions when one learns about causal relations via a description—as in a 
typical thought experiment—but that moral considerations do not affect causal intuitions when 
one learns about causal relations via experience, as in observing candidate causes and effects 
covarying.   Thus the evidence suggests that moral considerations significantly impact folk 
intuitions in the context of learning via description, as in the case of considering thought 
experiments.  Though I’m not aware of any specific empirical evidence on whether the agentive 
process is operative in causal learning via experience, I suspect that just as with the evaluative 
process, the agentive process is not operative in all aspects of causal learning.  What the evidence 
does suggest is that the evaluative and agentive processes are operative in some aspects of causal 
cognition; namely, in those aspects of causal cognition which are invoked when considering 
thought experiments.  Insofar as these processes give rise to folk intuitions of actual causation, 
they’re subject to debunking.   
Second, focusing on the role of teleological considerations in causal judgment, I would note that 
I am not adopting the following extreme view: for all cases, people either do or do not view a 
causal process in teleological terms.  When they do view the process in teleological terms, they 
view it as being more causal; when they do not view the process in teleological terms, they view 
it as less causal.  This is a mistake. So all folk judgments of actual causation are mistaken.29  I 
would emphasize that, as previously mentioned, I doubt that teleological considerations play a 
role in all aspects of causal cognition.  As the work of Danks, Rose and Machery (2013) 
suggests, there is good reason to suspect that teleology doesn’t play a role in causal judgment 
when learning via experience.  I also doubt that teleological considerations play a role in causal 
perception.  Again, what the evidence does suggest is that teleological considerations play a role 
in some aspects of causal cognition; in particular, teleological considerations play a role in those 
aspects of causal cognition that are operative in instances of learning via description. That said, 
                                                          
28 Though my own results do not themselves cast doubt on the usefulness of philosopher’s intuitions on these 
matters, this isn’t to say that philosopher’s intuitions are useful on these matters.  Indeed, when one looks at the 
range of conflicting claims about what is “intuitive” in the literature one finds a wide range of disagreement among 
philosopher’s, which may cast doubt on whether philosopher’s intuitions may be a helpful guide in these matters.   
29 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this. 
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even in cases of learning via description—as in typical thought experiments—we don’t currently 
have enough evidence to suggest that teleological considerations always play a role in this aspect 
of causal cognition.   Instead what the extant empirical evidence indicates is that teleological 
considerations sometimes play a role in generating intuitions about actual causation. So a great 
deal more empirical work would need to be done before this extreme view gained strong 
empirical support.  Until then, let me reiterate the more moderate view I am endorsing: insofar as 
folk intuitions of actual causation are generated by the agentive process, they are subject to 
debunking.  
To further clarify, I’m not claiming that the fact that teleological considerations play any role at 
all in folk intuitions of actual causation is a mistake.30  Instead, my view is that the role of 
teleological considerations in folk intuitions of actual causation is illegitimate in cases where the 
folk are mistaken to view the events in question in teleological terms.  Regarding rocks and 
clouds, I take it that it is prima facie clear that teleology is irrelevant.  In other domains, such as 
the biological domain, whether teleology is legitimate is a contested issue (see e.g., Allen and 
Bekoff, 1994).  My purpose here isn’t to settle the issue of whether teleology is legitimate in 
domains where it is contested.  Instead, I’m only taking it that teleology is a mistake when 
people were wrong to attribute it.  And to this, the evidence does indicate that the folk take 
teleological considerations to be relevant in assessing actual causation in connection with events 
involving rocks.  Putting this altogether: I take it that teleological considerations don’t always 
play a role in judgments of actual causation.  Nor, for that matter, do teleological considerations 
play a role in all aspects of causal cognition. But when they do, and when the folk are mistaken 
to view the events under consideration teleologically, I take it that these intuitions are subject to 
debunking.  The two-pronged debunking argument on offer is targeted—and thus tempered—and 
so succumbs to neither global nor local self-defeat.  It is thus fit for meeting the challenge from 
folk belief. 
V. Objections 
I presented evidence—in Section III—that two epistemically defective processes—the evaluative 
and agentive processes—play a role in generating folk judgments of actual causation.  And, in 
Section IV, I argued that these two processes give rise to a two-pronged debunking argument.  I 
now want to briefly consider some natural objections. 
5.1. The Two Processes are Epistemically Appropriate 
The first objection I want to consider is that the two processes which I claim are clearly 
epistemically defective are not clearly epistemically defective.  What the objector wants are 
some reasons for thinking that these two processes are epistemically defective.   
First, I take it that an account of actual causation ought to cohere well with a background 
scientific picture of the nature of reality.31  According to current scientific methodology, spirited 
                                                          
30 Thanks again to an anonymous reviewer for asking for clarification on this point. 
31 Here I join Paul (2012): after drawing on experience to develop a theory, in evaluating it we need to look back at 
the natural science just in case our ordinary experience of the world conflicts with what our best natural science says 
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beings—for instance, agentive forces such as Gaia—play no role in understanding the actual 
world and causal processes within our world.  To invoke spirited beings that make things happen 
in the world for a purpose is to adopt a muddled, pre-scientific, outmoded perspective on the 
natural world. To insist on following the folk is to buy into a Stone Age metaphysical 
perspective on the natural world, with all the crudity and superstition that comes along with it.   
Second, and concerning the evaluative dimension of folk intuitions of actual causation, one 
might be attracted to something like the following plausible epistemic principle:  
Recommendation: If E is an epistemically appropriate basis for reasoning about P, then 
one should be willing to recommend that others use E in reasoning about P. 
Insofar as one is willing to accept Recommendation, I would only ask whether it would be a wise 
policy to recommend that one consult their desire to blame in reasoning about actual causation. 
Imagine, for instance, that judges instructed jury members to consult their desire to blame in 
reasoning about whether some defendant caused some outcome.  Adopting such a policy would 
likely lead to disastrous consequences, especially for defendants being judged by jury members 
using such standards.  Why?  Because consulting ones desire to blame is an epistemically 
defective basis for reasoning about actual causation. 
Third—and again concerning the evaluative process—one might follow Driver (2008) in 
thinking that it’s natural to hold that “someone is morally responsible for an event only when that 
person has caused the event” (p. 423).  That is, a natural view is that moral responsibility entails 
causal responsibility.  On this view, causation is determined independent of considerations of 
moral responsibility.  As the evidence suggests, folk judgments run afoul of this reasonable 
principle. 
5.2. Other Processes Are Operative  
The next objection is that other, epistemically appropriate processes are operative.  There are two 
versions of this objection.  The first is that an epistemically appropriate process actually 
underwrites the two processes identified here.  The idea here is that the two epistemically 
defective processes which give rise to undermining defeaters are themselves defeated.  The 
objector is thus proposing a reinstater, seeking to gain ultima facie justification in following the 
folk.   The second is that though these two epistemically defective processes are operative, other 
“core” causal judgments—which are epistemically appropriate—are operative too and not 
infected by evaluative or agentive considerations.  
A natural proposal in connection with the first version of this objection is that causal and 
counterfactual selection are driven by a “counterfactual-influences-cause” process (Mandel, 
2003a). Evaluative or agentive considerations operate by guiding one toward the selection of 
counterfactuals which in turn guide causal selection.32 But a range of evidence suggests that  
                                                          
about the world. If it does conflict, then often the assumptions based on ordinary experience should be rejected (p. 
17).   
32 See e.g., Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) for an argument that norm violations guide counterfactual selection which 
then guide causal selection. 
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counterfactual selection doesn’t necessarily guide causal selection (see e.g., Mandel, 2003a, 
2003b; Mandel and Lehman, 1996; Mandel and Lehman, 1998).  For instance, the 
“counterfactual-influences-cause” process makes two predictions: (1) counterfactual judgments 
should facilitate causal judgments more than vice versa and (2) the correlation between 
importance ratings for counterfactual and causal selection should be greater when a 
counterfactual task precedes a causal task than vice versa (Mandel, 2003a, p. 421).  Against (1), 
Mandel, N’gbala and Bonnefon (2001) and Mandel (2003a) did not find evidence that 
counterfactual selection facilitated causal section, while against (2) Mandel (2003a) did not find 
that the correlation between importance ratings for counterfactual and causal selection was 
greater when a counterfactual task preceded a causal task.  Taken together, these results suggest, 
at best, a tenuous connection between counterfactual and causal selection and thus it is doubtful 
that evaluative or agentive considerations operate by guiding one toward the selection of 
counterfactuals which in turn guide causal selection.   Perhaps the evaluative and agentive 
processes are correlated with some other reliable indicator of actual causation.  But for this 
objection to work, we’d need some specific proposal to evaluate it and empirical evidence that 
the alleged epistemically appropriate process is underwriting the operation of the two 
epistemically defective processes. 
For the second version of the objection— that other “core” causal judgments which are 
epistemically appropriate are operative too—a natural proposal—operating with the image of 
billiard balls colliding—is that billiard ball kinds of causal judgments are instances of core causal 
judgments not corrupted by either the evaluative or agentive processes.  Following Michotte 
(1963) one might think, for instance, that causal judgments in response to motion events 
involving contact—such as launching or entraining—represent core causal judgments in that 
they are developmentally and conceptually prior to causal judgments based on agentive 
considerations. But as Saxe and Carey (2006) write, “the available data are…inconsistent 
with…[this] claim” (p. 145).   
At the earliest ages at which infants show sensitivity to launching or entraining events, infants 
also show a keen sensitivity to agentive considerations.  With entraining, Leslie (1984) presents 
evidence that infants attend to contact relations between a hand and inanimate object and view a 
hand and inanimate object moving together as causally interacting but do not view two inanimate 
objects moving together as causally interacting.  For launching, Saxe, Tenenbaum and Carey 
(2005) and Saxe, Tzelnic, and Carey (2007) present evidence that infants infer a hidden agent as 
the source of and primary cause of an inanimate object being set in motion. Muentener and 
Carey (2010) showed that when a train approaches a box and the box collapses, infants do not 
differentiate between cases where the train and box are or are not in contact but yet they do 
differentiate between contact and non-contact cases when the train is replaced by an agent (a 
puppet).  And they are surprised when the agent contacts the box and the box doesn’t collapse.  
Taken together the candidate core causal judgments—embodied in Michottian billiard ball 
causation—seem to be influenced by agentive considerations at the earliest ages at which infants 
show sensitivity to launching or entraining events.  Concerning the billiard ball model, and as 
Margaret Mead (1932) observed among the Manus people: “if a stone falls suddenly in the brush 
near an adult, he will usually mutter ‘a spirit’” (p. 118). 
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VI. Conclusion 
Philosophers often invoke the mantle of commonsense when evaluating theories of actual 
causation.  But, if a philosophical theory is to be measured by its fit with commonsense, then it 
seems that empirically discerning why the folk believe as they do will help in deciding whether 
measuring a theory by its fit with commonsense is a wise policy.   
I presented a range of evidence which suggests that two processes—the evaluative and agentive 
processes—are involved in generating folk judgments of actual causation.  In light of the 
empirical evidence, I argued for a two-pronged debunking explanation, which operates at two 
levels.  At level one, just as the medical astrologer’s belief that applying lipstick to the forehead 
alleviates headaches issues from an epistemically defective process so too folk intuitions of 
actual causation—insofar as they are based on either the desire to blame or primitive teleological 
considerations—issue from an epistemically defective process.  Level two invoked an 
undermining defeater.  Just as John’s belief, after learning that it was based on the testimony of a 
medical astrologer, suffers from an undermining defeater, so too the philosopher who relies on 
folk intuitions of actual causation as a reason to accept a theory of actual causation would suffer 
from an undermining defeater.   
Taken together, I hold that discussion over actual causation should be liberated from any 
demanded conformity with folk intuitions: the revisionist should not be compelled to square her 
account with the verdicts of the folk. In the dispute over actual causation, folk intuitions deserve 
to be rejected.  Thus, absent further empirical evidence, it seems that measuring a theory of 
actual causation by its fit with folk intuitions is not a wise policy.33   
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Appendix 
I. Study 1  
1.1 John, Bad Outcome 
John is an ecologist, studying a rare bird called Cantup.  Cantups need a rare, essential nutrient, 
Keterine, which they receive only from eating Weeble worms. Indeed, if the Cantups do not 
receive Keterine, they will die.  Weeble worms, however, do not naturally produce Keterine.  
Rather, Weeble worms receive Keterine by feeding from a rock, Zenite, which produces the rare, 
essential nutrient.  
Zenite produces Keterine through a chain of chemical reactions which is initiated and facilitated 
only by adsorbing heat.  For this reason, John keeps Zenite under a special heat lamp.  The 
chemicals involved in producing Keterine are densely concentrated in the upper surface of 
Zenite, since this is the area that is directly heated by the lamp.  
One day the power goes out in the whole town and so the heat lamp shuts off.  This prevents the 
upper surface of Zenite from being heated.  John knows that he must act quickly or else the 
Cantups will begin dying.  He notices that the bottom of the glass case containing Zenite is still 
very warm.  The only option he has is to turn Zenite over so that the densely concentrated 
chemicals can absorb heat from the bottom of the glass case. So, he turns Zenite over. 
Unfortunately, there is a volatile reaction between the chemicals and heat from the bottom of the 
glass case.  But John is completely unaware that this volatile reaction has occurred. The Weeble 
worms continue feeding from Zenite.  The Cantups continue to eat the Weeble worms and John 
begins to realize that something went wrong as the Cantups slowly start to die. 
 
1.2. John, Good Outcome 
John is an ecologist, studying a rare bird called Cantup.  Cantups need a rare, essential nutrient, 
Keterine, which they receive only from eating Weeble worms. Indeed, if the Cantups do not 
receive Keterine, they will die.  Weeble worms, however, do not naturally produce Keterine.  
Rather, Weeble worms receive Keterine by feeding from a rock, Zenite, which produces the rare, 
essential nutrient.   
Zenite produces Keterine through a chain of chemical reactions which is initiated and facilitated 
only by adsorbing heat.  For this reason, John keeps Zenite under a special heat lamp.  The 
chemicals involved in producing Keterine are densely concentrated in the upper surface of 
Zenite, since this is the area that is directly heated by the lamp.   
One day the power goes out in the whole town and so the heat lamp shuts off.  This prevents the 
upper surface of Zenite from being heated.  John knows that he must act quickly or else the 
Cantups will begin dying.  He notices that the bottom of the glass case containing Zenite is still 
very warm.  The only option he has is to turn Zenite over so that the densely concentrated 
chemicals can absorb heat from the bottom of the glass case.  So, he turns Zenite over. 
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The Weeble worms continue feeding from Zenite.  The Cantups continue to eat the Weeble 
worms and do not die. 
1.3. Rock, Bad Outcome 
In South Africa, there is a rare bird called Cantup.  Cantups need a rare, essential nutrient, 
Keterine, which they receive only from eating Weeble worms. Indeed, if the Cantups do not 
receive Keterine, they will die.  Weeble worms, however, do not naturally produce Keterine.  
Rather, Weeble worms receive Keterine by feeding from a rock, Zenite, which produces the rare, 
essential nutrient. 
Zenite produces Keterine through a chain of chemical reactions which is initiated and facilitated 
only by adsorbing heat.  For this reason, the chemicals involved in producing Keterine are 
densely concentrated in the upper surface of Zenite, since this is the area that is directly heated 
by sunlight. 
One day a tree branch falls on top of Zenite.  The branch prevents the sunlight from heating the 
upper surface of Zenite.  However, the densely concentrated chemicals located in the upper 
surface of Zenite migrate toward the lower surface of Zenite and absorb heat from the ground.  
Unfortunately, there is a volatile reaction between the chemicals and heat from the ground.  The 
Weeble worms continue feeding from Zenite.  The Cantups continue to eat the Weeble worms 
and slowly start to die. 
 
1.4. Rock, Good Outcome 
In South Africa, there is a rare bird called Cantup.  Cantups need a rare, essential nutrient, 
Keterine, which they receive only from eating Weeble worms. Indeed, if the Cantups do not 
receive Keterine, they will die.  Weeble worms, however, do not naturally produce Keterine.  
Rather, Weeble worms receive Keterine by feeding from a rock, Zenite, which produces the rare, 
essential nutrient.  
Zenite produces Keterine through a chain of chemical reactions which is initiated and facilitated 
only by adsorbing heat.  For this reason, the chemicals involved in producing Keterine are 
densely concentrated in the upper surface of Zenite, since this is the area that is directly heated 
by sunlight.  
One day a tree branch falls on top of Zenite.  The branch prevents the sunlight from heating the 
upper surface of Zenite.  However, the densely concentrated chemicals located in the upper 
surface of Zenite, migrate toward the lower surface of Zenite and absorb heat from the ground.  
The Weeble worms continue feeding from Zenite.  The Cantups continue to eat the Weeble 
worms and do not die. 
II. Study 2 
2.1. Cases 1.3 and 1.4 above 
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III. Study 3 
3.1. Andy, Intentional, Good Outcome 
Suzy is a botanist.  She recently discovered a rare plant, Cerbolis.  She noticed that some 
Cerbolis plants lived much longer than others, even though the plants were subject to the same 
environmental conditions.  So she studied the plants to try and determine why some were living 
longer than others. 
Suzy discovered that Cerbolis emits a toxin which coats its leaves.  The toxin prevents insects 
from eating the plant.  She noticed that the longer living plants were producing much lower 
doses of the toxin than the plants that were suffering premature death. The plants that were 
producing excess amounts of the toxin seemed to be poisoning themselves.  She noticed that one 
of the Cerbolis plants was not producing any of the toxin.  So, she gave it to one of her interns, 
Andy, to experiment with in order to determine what level of the toxin is appropriate to ensure 
the plants survival. 
Andy puts the Cerbolis plant in an aquarium and runs a hose into it.  The hose administers the 
toxin and is connected to a button.  When Andy wants to administer the toxin he simply presses 
the button.  The amount of toxin released is determined by how long Andy holds down the 
button.   
Andy places some insects in the aquarium and plans to administer some of the toxin when they 
begin swarming the plant. When the insects begin swarming the plant, Andy pushes the button 
which administers some of the toxin.  An appropriate amount of the toxin is released and the 
plant is saved from being infested by insects. 
 
3.2. Andy, Accidental, Good Outcome 
Suzy is a botanist.  She recently discovered a rare plant, Cerbolis.  She noticed that some 
Cerbolis plants lived much longer than others, even though the plants were subject to the same 
environmental conditions.  So she studied the plants to try and determine why some were living 
longer than others. 
Suzy discovered that Cerbolis emits a toxin which coats its leaves.  The toxin prevents insects 
from eating the plant.  She noticed that the longer living plants were producing much lower 
doses of the toxin than the plants that were suffering premature death. The plants that were 
producing excess amounts of the toxin seemed to be poisoning themselves.  She noticed that one 
of the Cerbolis plants was not producing any of the toxin.  So, she gave it to one of her interns, 
Andy, to experiment with in order to determine what level of the toxin is appropriate to ensure 
the plants survival. 
Andy puts the Cerbolis plant in an aquarium and runs a hose into it.  The hose administers the 
toxin and is connected to a button.  When Andy wants to administer the toxin he simply presses 
the button.  The amount of toxin released is determined by how long Andy holds down the 
button.   
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Andy places some insects in the aquarium and plans to administer some of the toxin when they 
begin swarming the plant. When the insects begin swarming the plant, Andy walks over to the 
aquarium so that he can push the button to administer some of the toxin.    As he is walking over 
he suffers a mild stroke and becomes confused and scrambled.  Surprisingly, he pushes the 
button which administers some of the toxin.  An appropriate amount of the toxin is released and 
the plant is saved from being infested by insects.  Given that Andy was completely confused and 
scrambled from the stroke, it was a complete accident that he allowed appropriate amounts of the 
toxin to be released. 
 
3.3. Andy, Intentional, Bad Outcome 
Suzy is a botanist.  She recently discovered a rare plant, Cerbolis.  She noticed that some 
Cerbolis plants lived much longer than others, even though the plants were subject to the same 
environmental conditions.  So she studied the plants to try and determine why some were 
suffering a premature death. 
Suzy discovered that Cerbolis emits a toxin which coats its leaves.  The toxin prevents insects 
from eating the plant.  She noticed that the longer living plants were producing much lower 
doses of the toxin than the plants that were suffering premature death. The plants that were 
producing excess amounts of the toxin seemed to be poisoning themselves.  She noticed that one 
of the Cerbolis plants was not producing any of the toxin.  So, she gave it to one of her interns, 
Andy, to experiment with in order to determine what level of the toxin is appropriate to ensure 
the plants survival. 
Andy puts the Cerbolis plant in an aquarium and runs a hose into it.  The hose administers the 
toxin and is connected to a button.  When Andy wants to administer the toxin he simply presses 
the button.  The amount of toxin released is determined by how long Andy holds down the 
button.   
Andy places some insects in the aquarium and plans to administer some of the toxin when they 
begin swarming the plant. When the insects begin swarming the plant, Andy pushes the button 
which administers some of the toxin.  He keeps the button pressed, administering a steady flow 
of the toxin.  Large amounts of the toxin are released and Andy continues to keep the button 
pressed as the plant slowly starts to die.   
 
3.4. Andy, Accidental, Bad Outcome 
Suzy is a botanist.  She recently discovered a rare plant, Cerbolis.  She noticed that some 
Cerbolis plants lived much longer than others, even though the plants were subject to the same 
environmental conditions.  So she studied the plants to try and determine why some were 
suffering a premature death. 
Suzy discovered that Cerbolis emits a toxin which coats its leaves.  The toxin prevents insects 
from eating the plant.  She noticed that the longer living plants were producing much lower 
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doses of the toxin than the plants that were suffering premature death. The plants that were 
producing excess amounts of the toxin seemed to be poisoning themselves.  She noticed that one 
of the Cerbolis plants was not producing any of the toxin.  So, she gave it to one of her interns, 
Andy, to experiment with in order to determine what level of the toxin is appropriate to ensure 
the plants survival. 
Andy puts the Cerbolis plant in an aquarium and runs a hose into it.  The hose administers the 
toxin and is connected to a button.  When Andy wants to administer the toxin he simply presses 
the button.  The amount of toxin released is determined by how long Andy holds down the 
button.   
Andy places some insects in the aquarium and plans to administer some of the toxin when they 
begin swarming the plant. When the insects begin swarming the plant, Andy walks over to the 
aquarium so that he can push the button which administers the toxin.    As he is walking over he 
suffers a mild stroke and becomes confused and scrambled.  He pushes the button which 
administers some of the toxin.  Large amounts of the toxin are released and the plant slowly 
starts to die.  Given that Andy was completely confused and scrambled from the stroke, it was a 
complete accident that large amounts of the toxin were released. 
 
3.5. KKM, Intentional, Good Outcome 
Suzy is a botanist.  She recently discovered a rare plant, Cerbolis.  She noticed that some 
Cerbolis plants lived much longer than others, even though the plants were subject to the same 
environmental conditions.  So she studied the plants to try and determine why some were living 
longer than others. 
Suzy discovered that Cerbolis emits a toxin which coats its leaves.  The toxin prevents insects 
from eating the plant.  She noticed that the longer living plants were producing much lower 
doses of the toxin than the plants that were suffering premature death. The plants that were 
producing excess amounts of the toxin seemed to be poisoning themselves.  To determine why 
some of the plants are producing appropriate amounts of the toxin, she gave some of them to her 
friend Andy, who is a molecular biologist. 
While studying Cerbolis, Andy noticed that the plants house a large store of the toxin.  The 
amount of toxin released is regulated by KKM.  KKM works as a “gate” which regulates the 
amount of toxin released.  So Andy thinks that KKM may have something to do with some of the 
Cerbolis emitting appropriate doses of the toxin.   
Looking more closely at one of the Cerbolis plants, Andy notices that KKM is carefully 
regulating the release of the toxin.  As insects start swarming the plant, KKM releases some of 
the toxin. As a result, the insects leave the plant and it does not die. 
Andy tries to figure out why KKM is allowing appropriate amounts of the toxin to be released.  
But, he can find no factor which contributed to KKM’s allowing appropriate amounts of toxin to 
be released.  Andy is baffled and tells Suzy that it looks to him like KKM just suddenly decided 
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to release appropriate amounts of the toxin, as if it was trying to save the plant from being 
infested by insects. 
 
3.6. KKM, Accidental, Good Outcome 
Suzy is a botanist.  She recently discovered a rare plant, Cerbolis.  She noticed that some 
Cerbolis plants lived much longer than others, even though the plants were subject to the same 
environmental conditions.  So she studied the plants to try and determine why some were living 
longer than others. 
Suzy discovered that Cerbolis emits a toxin which coats its leaves.  The toxin prevents insects 
from eating the plant.  She noticed that the longer living plants were producing much lower 
doses of the toxin than the plants that were suffering premature death. The plants that were 
producing excess amounts of the toxin seemed to be poisoning themselves.  To determine why 
some of the plants are producing appropriate amounts of the toxin, she gave some of them to her 
friend Andy, who is a molecular biologist. 
While studying Cerbolis, Andy noticed that the plants house a large store of the toxin.  The 
amount of toxin released is regulated by KKM.  KKM works as a “gate” which regulates the 
amount of toxin released.  So Andy thinks that KKM may have something to do with some of the 
Cerbolis emitting appropriate doses of the toxin.   
Looking more closely at one of the Cerbolis plants, Andy notices that KKM is carefully 
regulating the release of the toxin.  As insects start swarming the plant, KKM releases some of 
the toxin. As a result, the insects leave the plant and it does not die. 
Andy tries to figure out why KKM is allowing appropriate amounts of the toxin to be released. 
He finds that a chemical—DD12—collided with KKM.  After the collision, KKM appeared to be 
confused and scrambled, unable to regulate the release of the toxin.  Andy tells Suzy that it looks 
to him like KKM wasn’t trying to save the plant from being infested by insects: the collision 
made KKM confused and scrambled.  It was a complete accident that KKM allowed appropriate 
amounts of the toxin to be released. 
 
3.7. KKM, Intentional, Bad Outcome 
Suzy is a botanist.  She recently discovered a rare plant, Cerbolis.  She noticed that some 
Cerbolis plants lived much longer than others, even though the plants were subject to the same 
environmental conditions.  So she studied the plants to try and determine why some were 
suffering a premature death. 
Suzy discovered that Cerbolis emits a toxin which coats its leaves.  The toxin prevents insects 
from eating the plant.  She noticed that the longer living plants were producing much lower 
doses of the toxin than the plants that were suffering premature death. The plants that were 
producing excess amounts of the toxin seemed to be poisoning themselves.  To determine why 
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some of the plants are producing excess amounts of the toxin, she gave some of them to her 
friend Andy, who is a molecular biologist. 
While studying Cerbolis, Andy noticed that the plants house a large store of the toxin.  The 
amount of toxin released is regulated by KKM.  KKM works as a “gate” which regulates the 
amount of toxin released.  So Andy thinks that KKM may have something to do with some of the 
Cerbolis emitting large doses of the toxin.   
Looking more closely at one of the Cerbolis plants, Andy notices that KKM is carefully 
regulating the release of the toxin.  But suddenly KKM just stops regulating the release of the 
toxin. As a result, the plant slowly starts to die. 
Andy tries to figure out why KKM is allowing large amounts of the toxin to be released.  But, he 
can find no factor which contributed to KKM’s allowing the large amounts of toxin to be 
released.  Andy is baffled and tells Suzy that it looks to him like KKM just suddenly decided to 
release large amounts of the toxin, as if it was trying to kill the plant. 
 
3.8. KKM, Accidental, Bad Outcome 
Suzy is a botanist.  She recently discovered a rare plant, Cerbolis.  She noticed that some 
Cerbolis plants lived much longer than others, even though the plants were subject to the same 
environmental conditions.  So she studied the plants to try and determine why some were 
suffering a premature death. 
Suzy discovered that Cerbolis emits a toxin which coats its leaves.  The toxin prevents insects 
from eating the plant.  She noticed that the longer living plants were producing much lower 
doses of the toxin than the plants that were suffering premature death. The plants that were 
producing excess amounts of the toxin seemed to be poisoning themselves.  To determine why 
some of the plants are producing excess amounts of the toxin, she gave some of them to her 
friend Andy, who is a molecular biologist. 
While studying Cerbolis, Andy noticed that the plants house a large store of the toxin.  The 
amount of toxin released is regulated by KKM.  KKM works as a “gate” which regulates the 
amount of toxin released.  So Andy thinks that KKM may have something to do with some of the 
Cerbolis emitting large doses of the toxin.   
Looking more closely at one of the Cerbolis plants, Andy notices that KKM is carefully 
regulating the release of the toxin.  But suddenly KKM just stops regulating the release of the 
toxin. As a result, the plant slowly starts to die. 
Andy tries to figure out why KKM is allowing large amounts of the toxin to be released. He 
finds that a chemical—DD12—collided with KKM.  After the collision, KKM appeared to be 
confused and scrambled, unable to regulate the release of the toxin.  Andy tells Suzy that it looks 
to him like KKM wasn’t trying to kill the plant: the collision made KKM confused and 
scrambled.  It was a complete accident that KKM allowed large amounts of the toxin to be 
released. 
